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THE ORIGINAL U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A FAIRER FUTURE
Stephen G. Breyer*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Thank you very much. It is terribly nice for me to be here at
Hofstra. Thirty years ago, as the original Sentencing Guidelines were
going into effect, I spoke here to highlight some of the key compromises
we as Commissioners reached in writing them. Ten years later, in 1998,
I revisited the Guidelines at the Roman L. Hruska Institute in Nebraska
to discuss their history and to offer my recommendations for discussion
following a decade of their application. I am here today to commemorate
the history of the original Sentencing Guidelines, and to again offer my
suggestions to Congress, the Department of Justice, and to the current
United States Sentencing Commission.' While much has changed since
the Guidelines were considered in those speeches, my suggestions
remain the same.

II.

HISTORY

When Ken Feinberg and I were working on sentencing for Senator
Ted Kennedy, we were trying to find ways to reform sentencing
disparities that would be totally unopposed. Although the original
Guidelines may not have been perfect, there was nonetheless not much
opposition to them until they were released. Prior to that, sentencing
reform was called for by Marvin Frankel, Jon Newman, and various

* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. This keynote address was
delivered on October 23, 2017, at Hofstra Law School, in commemoration of the thirtieth
anniversary of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
f These remarks were adapted in part from a presentation given by Justice Breyer at the
Roman L. Hruska Institute, published as Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT'G
REP. 180 (1999). The transcript of Justice Breyer's address has been lightly footnoted and styled for
publication by the Board of Editors of the Hofstra Law Review, any errors herein should be
attributed solely to us.
1. See infra Part II.
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others; it was a great idea.2 In the beginning, there were many facts and
figures that showed great discrepancies in sentencing by federal judges.
They showed, for example, that if you were black and in the South and
you robbed a bank, your sentence on average was thirteen months more
than if you were white, or not in the South.3 There was also a study
performed in the Second Circuit in which judges were asked to sentence
hypothetical defendants, and it produced wild discrepancies.' The data
highlighted what Marvin Frankel and others used to say: if the sentence
does not depend on the judge, if it just depends on the crime and the
person, why are judges assigned by lottery?'
Ultimately, the Guidelines were developed because we wanted two
things: one was greater fairness (I note "-er" not "-est"), not perfect
fairness, but increased fairness where people would be treated more
alike.6 So, eliminating these discrepancies was one objective. The other
goal was to promote honesty in sentencing. It used to be such that a
federal judge would appoint her sentence for twenty years and then the
Parole Commission would cut it to seven. Aware of this, the judge, then
annoyed, would sentence the next defendant to sixty years so it would
only be cut to twenty, but that time the Parole Commission fooled her
and only cut it to thirty. For whatever it was, it was not straightforward
in the federal system. The original Sentencing Commission sought to
bring more fairness and more honesty into the sentencing process.
It is a much more difficult job writing Federal Guidelines than one
might think. The states generally do not have that many criminal
statutes. Early on, for example, we discovered that Washington State had
about a hundred separate criminal statutes. The federal government has
at least seven hundred and counting. The difference is that states tend to
follow the Model Penal Code approach, which matches certain behaviors
to crimes: "You have a behavior? It's a crime. This behavior is this
crime." Federal law does not necessarily follow that framework, because
a lot of the statutes are jurisdictional in nature. Consider the Travel Act.'
Many different kinds of behaviors violate the Travel Act, but there is a
federal hook for jurisdiction. Consider also, for example, the Hobbs
2.

See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCING: LAW WITHOUT ORDER

(1972); Jon 0. Newman, A Better Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A. J. 1562 (1977).
3. Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice ofthe Comm.
on the Judiciary, H.R., 100th Cong. 676-79 (1987) (testimony of Ilene H. Nagel, Commissioner,
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n).
4. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5 (1974).

5. See FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 12-25, 69-86.
6. Stephen G. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1, 13 (1988).
7. Travel Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2121-2124 (2012).
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Act.8 There are many statutes at the federal level that cover wide ranges
of behavior, and the Guidelines were written to cover behaviors, not
statutes. To write them for statutes would have been easy: "violating this
statute results in this sentence." But doing so would have turned all of
the power over to the prosecutor. That would have been a problem.
What we wanted to do was to take power away from the prosecutor
and to have the sentence imposed roughly reflect what was, in fact, the
behavior that underlay the crime and the characteristics that underlay the
offender. The Commission wound up not doing too much from the
perspective of offender characteristics because there were a lot of
disagreements between the Commissioners. This was because we knew
what the offender's conviction record was, which correlated with an
increased tendency to commit future crimes. In addition, the secondmost correlative factor was the offender's arrest record. The Guidelines
were written such that punishment would increase based on the
offender's prior convictions-that is, the past conviction would
represent a circumstance of the current sentence. A recidivist offender
has special reason to understand the wrongfulness of the later crime; a
recidivist is yet more likely to engage in future crimes, and a recidivist is
less likely to be rehabilitated. We looked for other correlations, but we
struggled to determine which other characteristics should be used. The
result was a decision to leave the other characteristics out of the
sentencing determination.
Next, we proceeded to figuring out the length of the sentence,
namely whether it should be based on the charged offense, real offense,
or some modified third approach. One Commissioner, Paul Robinson,
was determined to make every sentence turn on what the real behavior
was to the ninth degree. He came up with a complex plan, very nearly
employing advanced mathematics. The Commissioners and our advisors
reacted negatively, as did the judges we discussed the plan with. After
convening with Chairman William Wilkins, the decision was made to
move in a different direction.
Gradually, this different approach was worked out, and it was
referred to as "Draft X." 9 Commission staff members David Lombadero
and Peter Hoffman were highly involved with it, and Draft X became the
amalgamation of former parts into which other aspects were melded.
Eventually it was this draft which evolved into the first Guidelines
Manual.10 First, data from previous cases was used to conform Draft X
8. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
9. Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States
Sentencing Commission, 1985-1987,45 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1206-09 (2017).
10. Commissioner Michael Block and I sat down, and the key moment in my own psychology
occurred when he pointed out quite clearly to me that God doesn't tell us what the right sentence is.
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to typical past practices in sentencing. Research Director William
Rhodes had amassed data from 10,000 real cases, which included
information on what the offender's crime was, the offense of conviction,
past behavior to the extent it was included in presentence reports, and
what happened thereafter, including sentence length." Those 10,000
cases were available on computers and there were about 90,000 others
on file. Therefore, pretty reliable data existed as to: (1) what really
happened to people over the preceding years; and (2) what were the
factors that the judges really used in sentencing defendants. The aim was
to build Draft X to mirror what had actually been happening in federal
courts, and then to modify it based on the observable irrationalities. Each
change was discussed as a modification, and each modification was
debated between the Commissioners: should we or should we not depart
from what the history tells us federal judges have by and large actually
been doing?
Since neither the charged offenses nor real offenses could
realistically be used, the Commission developed a concept called "real
relevant offense" which required incorporation on a crime-by-crime
basis. 12 As an illustration, when someone commits a drug crime, the
Guidelines do not count the money that he stole in determining his
sentence, because that factor is far distant from what the defendant is
being accused of, it is fairly subjective. The relevant conduct, bit-by-bit,
was one of the harder things to work out, but it was eventually agreed
upon. It was not perfect by any means; it was a set of human beings
trying to make a rough approximation of what kinds of things should or
should not be taken into account in sentencing for this kind of a crime,
and that can be very discordant.
Following the debates and compromises we made, this later
version, a revised copy of Draft X, was approved by the Commission by
a six-to-one vote on April 11, 1987.13 The later version had taken the
comments from previous drafts into account, and we toured it with
judges around the country.
III.

SUGGESTIONS

The suggestions I made in 1999 at the Roman L. Hruska Institute
remain just that: suggestions. Today, I again offer one for
There is nothing that would tell us exactly how a person who has done a wrong thing should be
punished, and therefore we should not worry too much about being crude, nor worry too much
about trying to get it exactly right, which was impossible. In the end, the goal was to try to reduce
the unfairness in the system.
11. Breyer, supra note 6, at 7.
12. Newton & Sidhu, supra note 9, at 1259.
13. Id. at 1207.
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the Congress, one for the Justice Department, and one for the
Sentencing Commission.
My suggestion for Congress is to stay out of sentencing. The
Sentencing Commission was created as a preferable version of the,
Parole Commission, and was essentially tasked with building an
American version of the English system of "tariffs."14 Tariffs were
developed to roughly categorize the kinds of sentences that would be
imposed for certain kinds of behavior, but they were not written in stone.
This idea, shadowed by the Guidelines was thought to be: "Judge, you
have a typical case? Apply the guideline. Judge, you have an atypical
case? Depart." The trial judges would give their reasons, and the courts
of appeals would review them. The Commission would collect what the
courts of appeals say, and therefore there would be an iterative process
where these Guidelines could and would improve over time.
That iterative process was what was supposed to happen as the
Commission and the Guidelines matured. It did not happen very much in
practice, but now it is happening again because of Apprendi" and
Booker.'" Booker said the Guidelines are really voluntary and included
some language to determine whether the judge should make a departure
within the guideline or declare a variance. Really those words are
describing the same action, so I often wonder why judges do not simply
depart in the unusual case. The introduction to the Guidelines is very
nearly the same as it was when introduced in 1988, and points out that
the Commission had not considered every possible nuance in every case,
and therefore in an unusual case, it invites the judge to depart.1 7 Then,
the court of appeals will look at it, and should defer to the district court
insofar as it pertains to the individual. But, if the trial judge believes he
can write a better guideline from his bench without any information,
than the Commission can from its offices, with its staff, and with more
information, maybe the court of appeals should defer a little bit less.
Congress fundamentally influences sentencing through its
imposition of mandatory minimums. For one thing, statutory mandatory
sentences prevent the Commission from carrying out its basic,
congressionally mandated task: the development in part through
research, of a rational, coherent set of punishments. Mandatory
minimums will sometimes make it impossible for the Commission to
adjust sentences in light of factors that its research shows to be directly
relevant, such as the amount of a drug involved in a crime. In addition to
14.

FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 10.

15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
16. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
17.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).
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many other problems with mandatory minimums, they have been driving
the drug-related Guidelines, and I sympathize with the Commission's
awkward situation given that circumstance. Moreover, they do not give
the judge the opportunity to say, "Look this guy did transport forty tons
of cocaine across the international border, but it was somebody who was
lying on the dock somewhere and the real offender just dragged him to
the cab and said, 'Here's forty bucks, take it across the line."' Here, the
mandatory minimum takes away flexibility, which should not be laid at
the feet of the Guidelines. Congress also influences the Guidelines by
including add-on language to its statutes, which influence the
percentage-increases designed by the Commission to proportionately
increase or decrease sentences. Because the Guidelines increase
imprisonment terms by greater lengths at higher levels, congressional
add-ons distort the functioning of the system as designed.
The person who has the greatest political impact in this area is the
Attorney General of the United States, and no one else. Therefore, the
second recommendation is that the Department of Justice align itself
with the Sentencing Commission. To accomplish this, there must be
staff in the Department of Justice willing to spend four, five, or ten years
understanding sentencing and understanding the Guidelines. It would
ideally be at least one or two people with a voice on the Commission, to
be exercised in the long-term interests of the Sentencing Guidelines.
This means rationality, which means that there must be a staff voice
representing the Department of Justice, backed up by the Attorney
General. The issue has to be rationality, and the people who can do it
have to be the staff of the Justice Department.
My final suggestion, one for the Commission, is simplification.
Simplification is important and everybody knows that. But, it is a
question of bringing it about, which is hard to do. After all, one of the
reasons that first edition is as long as it is, is because there are so many
federal crimes and each one must be listed and keyed to specific
behaviors. Any crime at the individual level does not make the
Guidelines particularly lengthy, until add-ons are considered at which
point it becomes a mess. Simplification therefore becomes in part a
technical job. Every add-on removed provokes the enemy here, called
the legal mind. I think the economist Michael Block was right when he
said, "Don't make so many distinctions, keep it simple."
By coincidence, I made roughly the same recommendations to the
Roman Hruska Institute nineteen years ago, and nothing happened. But
discussion of suggestions for improvement, whether my own
suggestions or those of others, is necessary. Hope springs eternal, and
there we are. That is the same thing.
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